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Analysis of the Structural Vulnerability of the Interconnected Power 
Grid of Continental Europe with IPS/UPS Based on Extended Topological 
Approach 
 
Ettore Bompard, Enrico Pons, Di Wu,  
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Elettrica, Politecnico di Torino, Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 24, Torino, Italy 
 
Abstract 
Power systems as one of the key infrastructures play a crucial role in any country’s economy and 
social life. A large-scale blackout can affect all sectors in a society such as industrial, commercial, 
residential and essential public services. However, the frequency of large-scale blackouts across the world 
is not being reduced though advanced technology and huge investment have been applied into power 
systems. Given a single blackout it is possible to analyze the causes with the traditional engineering 
methods. What we want to do instead is not to explain the causes of blackouts but to find what are the 
most critical elements of the power system, in order to improve the resilience of the system itself. As 
blackout can happen in different load conditions, we do not want a method which depends on the 
load/generation level. We want a method independent from these factors: this is the structural perspective. 
When the interconnection between European and Russian power grids will create the largest 
interconnected power grid throughout the world in terms of the scale, transmission distance and involved 
countries, analyzing the vulnerability of the large-scale power grid will be useful to maintain its reliable 
and secure operation. To analyze the vulnerability of the interconnected power grid, in this paper we 
firstly create the interconnected transmission network between continental Europe and Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and Baltic countries; then, the structural vulnerability of the interconnected 
power grid is analyzed from a topological point of view using our proposed extended topological method 
which incorporates some electrical engineering characteristics into complex network methodology. We 
find that these power grids of continental Europe, Baltic states and CIS countries can benefit from the 
interconnection since the interconnected power grid cannot only improve the overall network 
performance of these power grids in Baltic states and CIS countries but also increase their structural 
robustness. 
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1. Introduction 
The Power grid is a key infrastructure for modern society. However, the frequency of large-scale 
blackouts across the world is not being reduced, especially in the United States, even though advanced 
technology and huge investments have been utilized in maintaining reliability and security of the system 
[1]. The series of blackouts seems to show that existing analysis techniques in electrical engineering are 
not easy tools to understand power systems because of their complexity [2]. This complexity is not just 
due to interwoven and intricate topology consisting of a multitude of buses and lines but also from 
complicated decision-making of system operators that maintain instant power balance of generators and 
loads in large-scale transmission networks across a multitude of countries in order to guarantee the 
security and reliability of the system. It is noticed that there is a strong link between topological structure 
and operation performance in power systems because the structural change could alter operational 
conditions of a power system and then change its operation performance. As a result, there is an 
increasing interest in analyzing structural vulnerability of power grids by means of complex network 
methodology. 
The vulnerability analysis of complex networks is mainly originated from ecological networks 
studies. It was found that food webs are very robust against random removals but extremely fragile when 
selective attacks are used [3]. Moreover, the robustness of food webs increases with its connectance 
which appears independent of species richness and omnivory [4]. After that, the kind of analysis arises in 
power grids [5][6][7]. It is found that North American power grid [5] and European power grid [6][7] 
have vulnerable response to the successive removal of nodes and similar to the scale-free network, though 
the two power grids do not have the topological feature of scale-free network [8][9] that frequency of 
nodes with connections follows a power-law distribution. 
However, the straight application of the complex network method neglects all the specific 
engineering features of power grids; therefore, the analytical results may be far from real-world power 
systems, and it seems more appropriate to analyze the structural vulnerability of electrical power grids 
combining some electrical engineering features with complex networks theory. Following this idea, the 
metrics of entropic degree [10], electrical betweenness [11] and net-ability [12] were proposed by 
  
introducing some electrical engineering features such as electrical distance, line flow limits and power 
transmission distribution into the complex networks metrics: degree [13], betweenness [14] and efficiency 
[15]. Moreover, two new metrics were defined to assess the vulnerability of power grids: entropic path 
redundancy [16] and survivability [17]. In this paper, we will use some of these extended metrics to 
analyze the structural vulnerability of the interconnected power grid made by the simplified power grid of 
the continental Europe together with the Intergrated Power System and Unified Power System (IPS/UPS) 
of CIS and Baltic countries1. Specifically, we investigate the classification of these power grids in terms 
of the cumulative distribution of entropic degree and extended betweenness; meanwhile, the critical buses 
and lines are located in each power grid using entropic degree and electrical betweenness. Furthermore, 
we analyze the resilience to intentional attacks on critical components in each power grid. By means of 
the structural vulnerability analysis, we expect to know whether the interconnection will be beneficial to 
these power grids in continental Europe and CIS and Baltic countries. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the extended 
topological method. In section 3, the interconnected power grid firstly is described and then its 
vulnerabilities are analyzed. The conclusions are summarized in section 4. 
 
2. Extended Topological Approach for Power Grids 
The complex networks theory has been applied in the analysis of electrical power grids. However, 
the pure topological concepts and metrics disregard the fundamental engineering features of electrical 
power grids; therefore the analysis resulting from the straight application of the complex network theory 
cannot capture the reality in power systems. Hence, we extend complex networks metrics by introducing 
some electrical features in order to practically analyze structural vulnerability of electrical power grid. 
Actually, the electrical power grid is a flow-based network where the power flow is transmitted from 
power plants to consumers; meanwhile, each line has parameters such as flow limits that can be 
considered as weights to describe the physical constraints on each line. Secondly, buses have different 
functions in power grids and can be classified as generator buses (G dim{G} = NG), transmission buses (T 
dim{T} = NT) and load buses (D dim{D} = ND). G is a set of buses injecting power in the grid while D is a 
set of buses withdrawing power from the grid; the set of buses T includes connection buses that transmit 
power. Thirdly, it is presumed that each line in power grids has a reference direction. Assume flij is the 
                                                        
1 The power grid of CIS countries is called as the Integrated Power System (IPS) while the power grid of Baltic 
countries is named as the Unified Power systems (UPS) [18]. 
  
flow on line lij, flij>0 means flij is consistent with the reference direction of line lij; otherwise, flij<0. 
Therefore, it is more feasible to consider the electrical power grid as a weighted and directed model Y = 
{B, L, W} where B (dim{B} = NB) is the set of vertices (or nodes); each vertex can be identified by index 
i; L (dim{L} = NL) is the set of edges (or links); the edge is identified by lij that represents a connection 
between vertex i and vertex j; W is set of weights and the weight element wij in the set W is associated 
each line lij.  
Instead of geodesic distance dij which is the number of edges in the shortest path between vertices i 
and j [19], the distance in a power grid should be considered as the electrical distance between a 
generation bus i and a load bus j in terms of equivalent impedance Zgd [12] which considers the 
impedance of transmission lines between them. Suppose Ugd is the voltage between generation bus g and 
load bus d; Ig is the current injected at bus g and withdrawn at bus d (Ig=-Id). The equivalent impedance 
can be expressed as: 
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Assume that a unit current is injected at bus g and withdrawn at bus d (i.e., Ig=1 and Id=-1) while no 
current is injected or withdrawn at other buses, then equivalent impedance can be calculated as: 
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where zgd is the g-th, d-th element of the impedance admittance matrix [20]. 
In complex networks theory, the degree ki, is a basic metric that can measure the criticality of vertex 
i, and a vertex with higher degree is more important than others. In unweighted networks, the degree of 
vertex i is the number of the edges connected to the vertex [13]; in a weighted network, the degree of 
vertex i is defined as the strength si of the vertex which is the sum of the weights on the edges connecting 
node i. However, the strength of a vertex cannot take account of the distribution of weights among edges, 
so the strength metric is unable to effectively identify importance of a bus in a power grid. Therefore, we 
redefine the entropic degree kiw of a vertex i by introducing the concept of entropy into the strength metric 
[10]: 
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where pij is the normalized weight of the edge lij connecting vertices i and j, and 1 1
N
ijj
p  B .  
The entropic degree has the same role as the degree metric to measure the importance of nodes. Also, 
the network classification (i.e., homogeneous or heterogeneous networks) can be identified by entropic 
degree cumulative distribution P(kw≥Kw). The distribution is the probability that the entropic degree of a 
node randomly selected is not smaller than Kw. In a homogeneous network, nodes basically have the 
similar entropic degree and its cumulative distribution is therefore a Poisson distribution, while in a 
heterogeneous network, most of nodes have a lower entropic degree, but small nodes, so-called hubs, 
have higher entropic degree than others and the entropic degree cumulative distribution is more possibly 
exponential or power law; hence, heterogeneous networks are more sensitive to intentional attacks on 
hubs but are resilient to randomly removal of nodes.  
Betweenness is another measure of the criticality of a vertex or an edge. Betweenness is the number 
of geodesic paths, connecting whichever pair of vertices, passing through a given vertex or edge in a 
network [14]. The higher betweenness is, a greater number of geodesic paths passing through the 
component (vertex or edge) are, and higher betweenness implies a higher criticality of the vertex or the 
edge. Therefore, the critical components of a network can be identified by ranking the betweenness value 
of the components in a network. 
In the definition of betweenness, it is assumed that a unit of physical quantity is transmitted along 
the geodesic path between a pair of vertices. However, in a power grid, more than one unit of power is 
transmitted along the electrical path from a generator to a load. As a consequence, we extend the 
betweenness metric by considering power transmission capacity Cgd and Power Transfer Distribution 
Factors (PTDF). 
Because power flowing on a line may be positive or negative, we define positive betweenness and 
negative betweenness of a line lij. Positive betweenness of a line, Bep(lij), is the sum of power flowing 
through the line along its reference direction when power is transmitted from all pairs of generator and 
load; on the other hand, negative betweenness of a line, Ben(lij), is the sum of power flowing through the 
line against its reference direction when power is transmitted from all pairs of generator and load. As it is 
impossible that both positive and negative power simultaneously exists on the same line, the extended 
betweenness of a line lij is the maximum between positive betweenness and negative betweenness of a 
  
line [11]. 
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where Be(lij) is extended betweenness of a line lij; Cgd is power transmission capacity which is defined as: 
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where Plijmax is the line flow limit of line lij; fgdlij is the power on line lij (lijL) for a unit of power injected 
at generation bus g (gG) and withdrawal at load bus d (dD), and fgdlij can be computed as follows: 
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where fglij and fdlij are respectively the lij -th row, g -th column and the lij -th row, d -th column of matrix 
F. Matrix F represent the NLⅹNB PTDF matrix in which an element fvlij represents the change of power 
on line lij for a unit of power injected at bus v and withdrawn at the reference bus. If fvlij is consistent with 
the reference direction of line lij, then fvlij>0; otherwise, fvlij<0. 
The input power of a bus v should be equal to output power of the bus, so the extended betweenness 
of a bus v is the half of sum of power flowing through the lines connecting the bus [11]. 
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where LV is the set of lines connecting a bus v. 
In analyzing the power grid, we use the extended betweenness instead of the classic betweenness to 
capture the electrical features of the power grid; extended betweenness is exploited as a measure of the 
importance of components and allows for the classification of the grid in terms of betweenness 
cumulative distribution (P(Be(v)≥Ov) or P(Be(l)≥Ol) that expresses the probability that the extended 
betweenness of a bus or a line, randomly selected, is greater or equal to Ov or Ol. 
In order to analyze the performance of a network, efficiency is introduced into complex networks 
theory [15]. In the definition of efficiency, it is assumed that a unit of physical quantity is transmitted 
along a geodesic path between a pair of vertices. Therefore, similarly to what was done for extended 
betweenness, we extended the metric of efficiency as net-ability by replacing a unit of physical quantity 
transmitted and geodesic distance with maximum transmission capacity and electrical distance, 
  
respectively [12]: 
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where NG and ND are the number of generation buses and load buses in a power grid, respectively ; Zgd is 
the equivalent impedance between generation bus g and load bus d. 
After identifying the importance of network components (buses and lines) based on entropic degree 
or extended betweenness, the structural vulnerability can be analyzed through removing successively 
buses or lines according to their decreasing values of entropic degree or extended betweenness while the 
change of network performance can be quantified as:  
 ( )( )
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Y
 (10) 
where A(Y-1) represents the net-ability of power grid after removal of a component. 
We would like to point out that we could also remove the buses or lines one by one and compare the 
drop in net ability; By removing the components successively we can just more easily see which are the 
most critical ones. This does not mean that during an attack all these elements will be attacked together or 
that the network can still operate in these conditions. We would also like to stress that the vulnerability 
analysis of power grids involves structure and operative conditions two sides [16]. The operative 
conditions refer to various load demands and the corresponding generations of power plants which are 
distributed in a power grid in terms of power flow while the structure of a power grid is the transmission 
network that is composed of buses and lines to transfer power from power plants to final users. 
Comparatively, the operative conditions of a power grid are usually changing due to continuously varying 
load demands whilst the structure of a power grid is relatively fixed because there are few changes over a 
long time in a typical configuration such as position of buses, length, impedance and line flow limit of 
transmission lines after the power grid operates. The outage of a power grid is considered as a result that 
the vulnerability of both operative conditions and structure simultaneously occurs. In other words, 
structural vulnerability is the inherent structural weakness of a power grid which is unrelated to operative 
states, but the weakness could not cause catastrophic consequences till the vulnerable operative 
conditions reach. 
The traditional vulnerability analysis based on AC or DC power flow computation depends on 
operative states; therefore various operative states will lead to various analysis results. On the contrary, 
the structural vulnerability analysis by means of complex network method can find out the structural 
  
weakness which inherently exists in a power grid. This paper focuses on the structural vulnerability 
analysis based on our proposed extended topological method. We will investigate and compare the 
structural vulnerability of various power grids by successively removing a group of critical buses, which 
is a typical scenario in structural analysis, though removing buses may be not feasibly considered as 
contingencies in traditional vulnerability analysis depending on operative conditions such as AC power 
flow calculation. In this paper, the network performance of a power grid is always evaluated in terms of 
net-ability, and the critical buses are identified by entropic degree and electrical betweenness. In next 
section, we will perform the structural investigation in the interconnected power grid between continental 
Europe, Baltic states and CIS countries. 
 
3. The Vulnerability Analysis of the Interconnected Transmission Power Grid 
3.1 The interconnected power grid constituted by the simplified continental Europe and IPS/UPS 
In this paper, we create a simplified interconnected power grid made of a simplified continental 
Europe power grid [21] and an IPS/UPS power grid as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively. The 
IPS/UPS has 713 buses and 943 lines while there are 1254 buses and 1944 lines in the simplified 
continental Europe power grid as shown in Table 1. In addition, the simplified continental Europe power 
grid has 17 members of continental Europe power grid as shown in Table 2. The continental European 
power grid which was the former Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) 
power grid is now one of 5 regional group power grids in ENTSO-E [22]. The simplified continental 
Europe and IPS/UPS power grids are interconnected by 7 interconnection tie lines connecting 7 pairs of 
buses as shown in Table 3. Figure 3 illustrates the interconnection of the simplified continental Europe 
and IPS/UPS power grids, and the number of components in the simplified interconnection power grid is 
shown in Table 1 as well. Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 give the detailed comparison of bus voltage level, 
transmission line voltage level and transformer voltage level in the simplified continental Europe power 
grid and IPS/UPS power grid as well as in the interconnected power grid. 
  
 
Figure 1 The simplified continental Europe power grid 
 
 
Figure 2 The IPS/UPS power grid 
 
Table 1 
 
Table 2 
 
Table 3 
 
  
 
Figure 3 The interconnected power grid of the simplified continental Europe with IPS/UPS 
 
Table 4 
 
Table 5 
 
Table 6  
 
3.2 Analyzing the vulnerability of the interconnected power grid 
In this paper, we assess the vulnerability of the interconnected continental Europe - IPS/UPS power 
grid using entropic degree, extended betweenness and net-ability. These three metrics seem to be able to 
provide better information than their purely topological counterparts [10][11][12]. Firstly, it is important 
to spot out the critical components which have higher connectivity or power transmission. After that, 
these three power grids will be analyzed and compared according to the resilience to intentional attacks 
on critical components. 
The entropic degree is a good indicator of the topological importance of buses in power grids; thus 
we compute the cumulative distributions of entropic degree in the IPS/UPS power grid, simplified 
continental Europe power grid and interconnected power grid. We find that these distributions follow 
three exponential distributions as shown in Figure 4 and the corresponding fitting functions of these 
distributions are described in Table 7. Similarly, cumulative extended betweenness distributions of buses 
are also computed in these power grids. These distributions are exponential as shown in Figure 5 and at 
the same time Table 8 reports the fitting function of distributions of extended betweenness. As a result, 
these power grids seem to be heterogeneous networks where some buses have higher entropic degree or 
extended betweenness than others. In other words, there exist some critical buses with higher entropic 
  
degree or extended betweenness in each of the three power grids. In the following structural vulnerability 
analysis, we can see that these critical buses play an important role in maintaining the global network 
performance of each power grid in terms of net-ability. 
Moreover, it is found that critical buses with respect to high degree are possibly not those buses with 
high extended betweenness. We can rank the components in descending order of entropic degree and 
extended betweenness, respectively. Table 9 and Table 10 report the top 10 most critical buses spotted by 
entropic degree and extended betweenness in these power grids, respectively. As we can see in the two 
tables, entropic degree gives a different ranking of criticality of buses from extended betweenness. For 
instance, the rank of bus 1329 in IPS/UPS is the fifth position according to entropic degree whereas the 
bus is the first in terms of extended betweenness. On the other hand, the most critical bus according to 
entropic degree is bus 1369 of IPS/UPS which cannot be found in Table 10. Thus, both entropic degree 
and extended betweenness can provide information about various patterns of multiple attacks on the 
systems, and so both of them should be considered in the vulnerability analysis. According to Figure 4 
and Figure 5, it is possible that the most vulnerable network to intentional attacks is the IPS/UPS network, 
as both its entropic degree and extended betweenness distributions have steeper slopes, which means that 
it has a lower connectivity and smaller number of buses with higher power transmission inside the 
IPS/UPS power grid. 
Table 7 
 
Table 8 
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Figure 4 Cumulative distributions of entropic degree in various power grids 
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Figure 5 Cumulative distributions of bus extended betweenness in various power grids 
 
Table 9 
 
Table 10 
Then, we compare the network performances of three power grids in terms of net-ability A(Y), 
defined in equation (9), which evaluates the global performance of a power grid according to the ratio 
between power transmission capabilityand electrical distance through all pairs of generators and loads in 
a power grid. The results are reported in Table 11 where it is shown that the net-ability of the 
interconnected power grid is between the two original separated grids and even lower the average of 
net-ability of two power grids. From a topological point of view, only the weaker network, the IPS/UPS, 
appears to benefit from the interconnection, as the simplified continental Europe power grid has still a 
much better global performance than the interconnected power grid. The reason for this can be found by 
comparing the averaged power transmission capacity dgC and averaged electrical distance dgZ of each 
power grid as shown in Table 11. dgC  is that sum of the power transmission capacity between each pair 
of generator and load is averaged by all pairs of generator and load, and dgZ  is that sum of the equivalent 
impedance between each pair of generator and load is averaged by all pairs of generator and load. 
Interconnected power grid has smaller dgC  and larger dgZ  than simplified continental Europe, which 
causes the net-ability of the interconnected power grid is smaller than simplified continental Europe 
  
power grid. As we can see, IPS/UPS power grid with the lowest power transmission capacity bring about 
that interconnected power grid has a lower transmission capacity; on the other hand, the long distance 
connection between continental Europe and IPS/UPS increases the electrical distance of interconnected 
power grid. As a result, increasing the capacity of transmission line in IPS/UPS power grid and reducing 
the long interconnected distance between continental Europe and IPS/UPS power grids could effectively 
enhance the whole performance of interconnected power grid. 
Table 11 
Furthermore, we investigate the effect on global performance of randomly and intentionally 
attacking buses of each power grid, using Anorm(Y-1) defined in equation (10). The reason why we choose 
buses instead of lines as random and selective failures in each power grid is that we attempt to analyze the 
vulnerability of these three power grids in the worst case from a structural angle. As we know, the 
deletion of a bus has a more serious consequence in a power grid than a line from a structural perspective 
since the attack on a bus will damage all lines connecting the bus rather than only a line.  
Moreover, in the case of the intentional attack, a set of critical buses are generally selected instead of 
all buses [5]. As a result, the intentional attacks in each power grid are the most critical 100 buses in terms 
of descending order ranked by entropic degree and electrical betweenness, respectively; then, these buses 
are successively removed from each power grid to analyze the structural vulnerability. Also, we randomly 
choose 100 buses as random attacks in each power grid in order to compare the results with that of 
intentional attacks. For these random attacks, 100 buses are randomly selected and then removed 
successively from each power grid in a simulation and then the net-ability is evaluated by averaging 100 
simulations of the random failures in each power grid. Besides, the first 100 most critical buses are 
chosen as selective failures according to the descending order ranked by strength and topological 
betweenness metrics, respectively, because we expect to further demonstrate the superiority of extended 
topological metrics to topological metrics in large-scale power grids. 
When these power grids are attacked either randomly or deliberately, we monitor the change of 
network performance Anorm(Y-1) as a function of the number of removed buses shown in Figure 6-Figure 
8. As we see from these figures, initially, the net-ability of each power grid is 100% because of no attack 
on buses has been performed in these power grids. However, the net-ability decreases dramatically with 
increasing number of the removed buses since the changed power transmission paths cause the growing 
electrical distance and the reducing power transmission capacity. Especially, it can be seen that these 
power grids are heterogeneous networks which are sensitive to intentional attacks but relatively robust to 
  
random failures as in each power grid net-ability drops much more steeply in selective failures cases. 
Besides, it seems that these 100 critical buses identified in terms of topological or extended topological 
metrics are indeed significant for each power grid because less 50% of initial net-ability can be 
maintained after removing these critical buses from each power grid. Particularly, in the IPS/UPS power 
grid, less 20% of its original net-ability can be retained after these critical buses are deleted. 
Comparatively, though the selective failures scenario for entropic degree shows no much clear superiority 
to the strength metric, extended topological metrics are generally better than topological metrics. The 
reason for this is that net-ability of each power grid drops more quickly when buses are intentionally 
attacked in terms of extended topological metrics. 
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Figure 6 Relative network performance of the IPS/UPS power grid after removing 100 buses in 
various scenarios 
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Figure 7 Relative network performance of the simplified continental Europe power grid after removing 
100 buses in various scenarios 
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Figure 8 Relative network performance of the interconnected power grid after removing 100 buses in 
various scenarios 
At the same time, we compare the vulnerability of these power grids in the case where only critical 
buses are deliberately deleted in terms of entropic degree (shown in Figure 9) or extended betweenness 
(shown in Figure 10). As can be seen from Figure 9, the IPS/UPS power grid is more vulnerable than 
other power grids because the IPS/UPS power grid loss its net-ability faster than other power grids when 
the 100 critical buses for entropic degree are removed successively. The reason for this can be found in 
Figure 4 where the IPS/UPS power grid has smaller probability that buses have higher connectivity in 
terms of entropic degree than other power grids. In other words, compared with the simplified continental 
Europe and interconnected power grid, the IPS/UPS power grid has smaller number of buses with higher 
connectivity. Meanwhile, this power grid has also smaller number of transmission lines to construct 
power transmission paths connecting generators and loads. As a result, after removal of 100 critical buses 
from the power grid, few buses with higher connectivity and power transmission paths could remain in 
the IPS/UPS power grid so that its net-ability drops quickly. On the other hand, although Figure 4 
illustrates that the simplified continental Europe and interconnected power grids basically have the same 
probability of buses with higher connectivity, Figure 9 shows that the interconnected power grid is more 
robust. The explanation for this is that the interconnected power grid has more generators, loads and 
transmission lines than the simplified continental Europe power grid; therefore, after the same number of 
critical buses is removed from each of the two power grids, the interconnected power grid could have 
more power transmission paths to preserve its net-ability. 
  
Similarly, as for attacks on buses ordered in terms of bus extended betweenness, we can see from 
Figure 10 that the IPS/UPS power grid is also more vulnerable than other power grids, after the 100 
critical buses are removed successively from each power grid. This is due to the fact that the bus extended 
betweenness represents the power transmitted through a bus. Figure 5 shows that the IPS/UPS power grid 
has a smaller number of buses transmitting a larger amount of power than other power grids whilst, by 
contrast, the interconnected power grid has the largest number of this kind of buses among the three 
power grids. Therefore, after removing the 100 critical buses from each power grid, a few buses which 
can transmit higher power remain in the IPS/UPS power grid to maintain its net-ability while 
interconnected power grid still has larger number of remaining buses which can transmit more power so 
that the interconnected power grid can still stay at the higher level of net-ability. 
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Figure 9 Comparison of relative network performance in various power grids after removing critical 
buses ranked by entropic degree 
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Figure 10 Comparison of relative network performance in various power grids after removing critical 
buses ranked by extended betweenness 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the change of net-ability in each power grid when each power grid is 
intentionally attacked. The changing net-ability of the three power grids are normalized by the original 
performance of each power grid, respectively. However, the difference of original net-ability for each 
power grid that was presented in Table 11 is not showed in Figure 9 and Figure 10 because of the chosen 
normalization mode. For this reason, we also show the changed net-ability in Figure 11 and Figure 12 
where the net-ability of each power grid is normalized by the largest original net-ability among the three 
power grids (i.e., the simplified continental Europe power grid) when each power grid is intentionally 
attacked in terms of either entropic degree or extended betweenness. It can be seen from Figure 11 and 
Figure 12 that the interconnected power grid always maintains a net-ability that mediates the 
performances of the two separate power grids in the whole attacking process. Moreover, we can observe 
that the loss of net-ability in the interconnected power grid is slower than in the other two power grids 
when 100 critical buses are removed successively. That is, the interconnection of the two original power 
grids with a small number of tie lines creates a network which has an average net-ability between two 
original power grids but is more robust than two separate power grids under intentional attacks. 
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Figure 11 Comparison of network performance in various power grids after removing critical buses 
ranked by entropic degree 
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Figure 12 Comparison of network performance in various power grids after removing critical buses 
ranked by extended betweenness 
4. Conclusions 
As the interconnection between European and Russian power grids will create the largest 
interconnected power grid in the world, analyzing the vulnerability of the large-scale power grid is 
necessary to maintain its reliable and secure operation. The vulnerability of power grids can be analyzed 
from operative statuses and structure two sides. In other words, the outage of a power grid is considered 
as a result that the vulnerability of both two sides simultaneously occurs. The structural vulnerability is 
  
the inherent topological weakness of a power grid which is independent of varying operative states. 
In this paper, we analyze the structural vulnerability of the large-scale interconnected transmission 
network connecting continental Europe and CIS and Baltic countries using our proposed extended 
topological method. Similar to studies in North American and European power grid, our analysis shows 
that each investigated power grid is vulnerable to selective failures of critical buses but robust to random 
failures, though each single power grid displays less skewed exponential entropic degree distribution than 
a power-law distribution. Moreover, the different response of each power grid to selective and random 
failures is independent of the extended measures (i.e., entropic degree or electrical betweenness). 
Comparatively, when these three power grids are deliberately attacked, the interconnected power grid is 
the most robust among the three power grids while the IPS/UPS power grid is the most vulnerable. 
Meanwhile, when the network performances of these power grids are evaluated in terms of net-ability 
measure, the interconnection of the simplified continental Europe and IPS/UPS power grids can only 
improve the network performance of the IPS/UPS rather than both of continental Europe and IPS/UPS 
power grids. The reason for this is that the lower line transmission capacity in IPS/UPS power grid than 
continental Europe reduces its averaged power transmission capacity and so the interconnected power 
grid has the averaged lower transmission capacity as well; on the other hand, the long distance connection 
between continental Europe and IPS/UPS increases the electrical distance in the interconnected power 
grid. Consequently, increasing the capacity of transmission line in IPS/UPS power grid and reducing the 
long interconnected distance between continental Europe and IPS/UPS power grids could not only 
effectively enhance the whole performance of interconnected power grid, but aslo increase the structural 
robustness of the simplified continental Europe and IPS/UPS power grids. 
 
5. Symbols 
Y Undirected and unweighted graph, Y ={B, L} 
B Set of vertices , B={…,i,…},dim{B}=NB, B=G∪D∪T 
G Set of generation buses, G⊆B={…,g,…}, dim{G}=NG 
D Set of load buses, D⊆B={…,d,…}, dim{D}=ND 
T Set of transmission buses, T⊆B={…,t,…}, dim{T}=NT 
L Set of edges, L={…,lij,…}, dim{L}=NL, i≠j∈B 
LV Set of edges connecting vertex v, L ={…,liv,…, lvj ,…} 
W Set of weights, W ={…,wij,…}, i≠j∈B 
ki Degree of a vertex i 
si Strength of a vertex i 
dij Geodesic distance between vertex i and vertex j 
  
pij Normalized weight of the edge lij 
kiw Entropic degree of a vertex i 
P(kw≥Kw) Entropic degree cumulative distribution 
Ugd Voltage between generation bus g and withdraw at load bus d 
Ig Current injected at bus g and withdrawn at bus d 
Zgd Equivalent impedance for injection at generation bus g and withdraw at load bus d. 
zgd The g-th, d-th element of the bus impedance matrix 
Cgd Power transmission capacity from generator bus g to load bus d 
flij Flow on line lij 
F PTDF matrix, dim(F) = NL ⅹNB 
fglij The lij –th, row g -th column of matrix F 
fgdlij Flow on line lij for a unit of power injected at generation bus g and withdrawal at load bus d 
Plijmax  Line flow limit of line lij 
Bep(lij) Positive betweenness of a line lij 
Ben(lij) Negative betweenness of a line lij 
Be(lij) Extended betweenness of a line lij 
Be(v) Extended betweenness of a bus v 
P(Be(v)≥Ov) Cumulative distribution of bus extended betweenness 
P(Be(l)≥Ol) Cumulative distribution of line extended betweenness 
A(Y) Net-ability of network Y 
A(Y-1) Net-ability of power grid after removal of a component 
Anorm(Y-1) Normalized net-ability of a network Y after removal of a component 
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Table 1 Number of components in the simplified continental Europe, IPS/UPS and interconnected power 
grids 
 Simplified continental Europe IPS/UPS Interconnected power grid 
Bus 1254 713 1963 
Line 1944 943 2890 
Transformer 0 210 210 
Generator 378 399 777 
Load 896 547 1443 
 
Table 2 Members of the simplified continental Europe power grid 
Member countries of continental 
Europe power grid [22] 
Member countries of the simplified continental Europe 
power grid 
Austria √ 
Belgium √ 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Bulgaria  
Croatia √ 
Czech Republic √ 
Denmark (west) √ 
France √ 
FYROM  
Germany √ 
Greece  
Hungary √ 
Italy √ 
Luxemburg √ 
Montenegro  
Netherlands √ 
Poland √ 
Portugal √ 
Romania  
Serbia  
Slovakia √ 
Slovenia √ 
Spain √ 
Switzerland √ 
 
Table 3 Interface tie lines of the simplified continental Europe with IPS/UPS 
Bus name Country Bus name Country 
PL-79 Poland HAES-750 Ukraine 
SK-6 Slovakia BuTES-3 Ukraine 
H-5 Hungary BuTES-3 Ukraine 
H-12 Hungary ZUkr750 Ukraine 
PL-2 Poland ALITUS Lithuania 
PL-8 Poland ROSS' Belarus 
PL-51 Poland DTES-2 Ukraine 
 
Table 4 Bus voltage level of the simplified continental Europe, IPS/UPS and interconnected power grids 
Voltage [kV] 750 500 400 380 330 220 150 120 110 70 27 Total 
Simplified continental Europe 0 0 0 1254 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1254 
IPS/UPS 25 199 3 0 252 205 0 0 29 0 0 713 
Interconnected power grid 25 199 3 1250252 205 0 0 29 0 0 1963 
 
  
 
Table 5 Line voltage level of the simplified continental Europe, IPS/UPS and interconnected power grids 
Voltage [kV] 750 500 400 380 330 220 150 120 110 70 27 Total 
Simplified continental Europe 0 0 0 1944 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1944 
IPS/UPS 26 311 1 0 366 218 0 0 21 0 0 943 
Interconnected power grid 26 311 1 1947366 218 0 0 21 0 0 2890 
 
Table 6 Transformer voltage level of the simplified continental Europe, IPS/UPS and interconnected 
power grids 
Ratio 750/500 750/330 500/400500/330500/220 500/110400/330 330/330 330/220 330/110220/110Total
Simplified continental 
Europe 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IPS/UPS 10 17 1 7 104 1 1 1 35 15 18 210
Interconnected power 
grid 
10 17 1 7 104 1 1 1 35 15 18 210
 
Table 7 Cumulative distribution functions of entropic degree in various power grids 
Power grid P(kw≥Kw) 
IPS/UPS 0.8678exp(-17.394kw) 
Simplified continental Europe 0.8474exp(-9.829kw) 
Interconnected power grid 0.7953exp(-10.482kw) 
 
Table 8 Cumulative distribution functions of bus extended betweenness in various power grids 
Power grid P(Be(v)≥Ov) 
IPS/UPS 0.8981exp(-46.25Be(v)) 
Simplified continental Europe 0.8872exp(-17.764Be(v)) 
Interconnected power grid 0.8368exp(-8.7251Be(v)) 
 
Table 9 The 10 most critical bus IDs for entropic degree in various power grids 
Rank IPS/UPS Simplified continental Europe Interconnected power grid 
1 1369 396 396 
2 1309 105 105 
3 1407 427 427 
4 1333 407 407 
5 1329 364 364 
6 1565 466 199 
7 1428 199 466 
8 1300 1054 1174 
9 1531 1102 1054 
10 1424 151 372 
 
Table 10 The 10 most critical bus IDs for extended betweenness in various power grids 
Rank IPS/UPS Simplified continental Europe Interconnected power grid 
1 1329 427 1858 
2 1333 407 1181 
3 1565 302 1813 
4 1318 523 1325 
5 1309 666 1832 
6 1885 559 1054 
7 1314 486 1840 
  
8 1566 458 1750 
9 1287 932 1185 
10 1365 886 427 
 
Table 11 Comparison of network performances of various power grids 
 IPS/UPS Simplified continental Europe Interconnected power grid 
d
gC  787．39 1755.87 1177.19 
d
gZ  0.1205 0.1219 0.1499 
Net-ability 11991.91 24119.11 13348.17 
 
 
